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INTRODUCTION
In the mid-1990s Michael Reich and Gill Walt, drawing on
independent lines of work, called for an injection of political
economy thinking into health policy analysis in low- andmiddle-
income countries (LMICs). Reich noted that “policy reform is
inevitably political because it seeks to change who gets valued
goods in society”1(p49-50) and Walt, that health policy is “con-
cerned with who influences whom in the making of policy, and
how that happens.2(p1) Both concluded that neither primarily
technical work, such as economic analysis, nor a well-designed
policy are themselves enough to bring about policy change.
Rather, deliberate and specific analysis of the wider political
forces, the actors, processes and power, influencing such change
is necessary to understand its political feasibility—and to con-
sider how to support the process of change.
As we approach 2020, the call for Universal Health
Coverage (UHC) has ensured that health financing reform
is on policy agendas around the world. Such large-scale
health financing and system reform is quintessentially poli-
tical—given that interests compete, there is much to gain and
lose, and the current institutional status quo is inevitably
challenged. It is no surprise that health financing reform is
being contested and debated in parliaments as well as pub-
licly from the highest to lowest income countries.
Yet, there remains barely any political economy analysis of
health financing reform in LMICs. Although there is no current
mapping of literature in the field, only 13 out of 100 exemplar
papers included in the 2018 LMIC Health Policy Analysis
Reader had an explicit focus on financing policy.3 Earlier map-
ping reviews have demonstrated the small and fragmented nature
of the overall field, and its limited consideration of health finan-
cing issues. In an overall field review for 1994–2007, only 15 out
of 164 empirical papers addressed such issues4 and over
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a slightly longer period (1994–2009), only 6 out of 86 empirical
papers specifically addressed financing policy implementation
(that is, the experience of putting policy into practice within the
health system).5
This special issue of Health Systems & Reform on the
Political Economy of Health Financing Reform is important,
then, in bringing attention to the importance of applying
a political economy lens both in understanding the chal-
lenges of health financing reform in the UHC era and,
critically, in thinking through strategies to support its imple-
mentation. The articles in this issue present a political econ-
omy framework for analyzing policy experience,6 as well as
various examples of its application.
In this commentary, the framework is briefly applied to
understand the 25-year history of debate and contestation
around large scale health financing reform in South Africa.
At the time of the first democratic elections in 1994, it was
widely recognized that significant restructuring of the frag-
mented, inequitable and inefficient health system inherited
from the apartheid era was needed.7 Twenty-five years later
it has, however, not yet been possible to secure sufficient
political and popular support for any set of related proposals.
This commentary first uses the framework6 to explore
what forms of contestation around financing reform in
South Africa explain the failure to achieve policy
change. Second, it presents four general reflections about
the use of the framework by government strategy teams
tasked with supporting health financing reform.
SOUTH AFRICAN HEALTH FINANCING REFORM
EXPERIENCE 1994–2019
The run up to the May 2019 South African general elections
saw vigorous public debate focused on the needs for and
constraints to implementing the 2018 National Health
Insurance (NHI) Bill, given what newspapers have generically
called: “the collapse of the public health system”; revelations
of broader state and public sector corruption (widely known in
South Africa as “state capture”); concerns about supplier
induced demand and other pressures underlying rising costs
in the private health sector, and the government’s difficulties
in adequately regulating this sector (see various reports at
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/author/spotlight/). By estab-
lishing a central funding organization that would pool public
and private financing and act as the primary purchaser within
the health system, this Bill essentially seeks to support equity
in financing by enabling cross-subsidization within the health
system, as well as leveraging efficiency gains. A future pub-
lic/private provider network is also envisaged, with primary
health care providers managed by a strengthened District
Health System (DHS) and primary health care contracting
units within the public sector.
This is just the latest turn in the 25-year process of recurring
policy debate about comprehensive health financing reform
since the first democratic elections of 1994. In the late 1990s,
a first set of commissions and committees considered what was
then termed “Social Health Insurance,” as well as reform of the
private insurance (medical aid) industry. They delivered insur-
ance reform (the 1998 Medical Schemes Act) but not wider
reform.8,9 Although agenda setting continued in the 2000s,10
there was little significant policy development after 1997—in
large part because national health policy priority attention was
then focused on how to respond to the HIV/AIDS epidemic.11 It
was only after the 2007 leadership change within the ruling
African National Congress (ANC) party that NHI was brought
squarely into the policy debate.10,11 The 2011 publication of the
NHI Green Paper demonstrated renewed political commitment
to significant health financing and system reform, and this was
(after delays) reaffirmed by the 2015 NHI White Paper, and the
2018 NHI Bill. Following the May 2019 national elections, the
country waited to see what would happen next; and in early July
2019, the new Minister of Health announced that Cabinet had
approved the Bill for tabling in Parliament for public
consultation.
Underlying this long history of recurring policy debate
lies contestation among powerful groups, competing policy
interests and pressures within and across sectors, and an
evolving context. The political economy framework6 helps
understand these forces.
As summarized in Table 1, leadership and budget politics
have consistently shaped the process over time—reflecting
imperatives and tensions within the wider political and eco-
nomic context, and economic policy imperatives. Political
contestation within and beyond the ANC and fragmented
authority to drive NHI policy forward, with particular dis-
agreements between national Treasury (Finance) and Health
officials, have been recurring blocks to policy progress.
Amongst interest groups, the broadly government-aligned
Trade Union federation has become a supporter of NHI over
time, and perhaps with growing influence11; whilst the posi-
tion of health professionals and some private health sector
actors has often been unclear, or perhaps just not well under-
stood. Waterhouse et al.11 highlight examples of how private
health sector actors have used their financial and technical
capacity to influence other health policy areas and report
speculation that politicians and senior civil servants are
influenced by private health care interests. Table 1 suggests,
however, that none of beneficiary, bureaucratic or external
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1994–19997 2000–20109 2007–201710
Summary,
financing
policy
process
Free care implemented for mothers and
children, and for PHC generally.
No policy agreement around broader
financing reform, despite several
waves of technical discussions in
open and closed committees
Policy discussions continued behind
closed doors in technical
commissions until 2008/9, when the
President and national Minister of
Health made public statements to
NHI
Pace of NHI development inconsistent,
with continuing technical work
conducted behind closed doors. Green
Paper released in 2011, but White
Paper not released until 2015. Work
streams established 2016 to develop
further details of the proposals. District
NHI pilot sites established in 2012.
Interest groups
politics
Largest Trade Union federation aligned
with government, though did voice
opposition to 1997 SHI policy
proposals
Insurance industry divided and in weak
position post-elections, so weak
influence on policy process
Support for moves towards NHI from
wide range of health and non-health
Trade Unions
Private sector (insurance industry &
providers) position unclear, not
publicly stated but seem to have
engaged in policy process
Health professionals as part of middle
class may have had influence in
pushing for NHI
Largest Trade Union federation highly
supportive of NHI and publicly
criticized Health and Treasury
leadership for obstructing NHI
Private sector assumed to oppose NHI,
but support has been expressed by
insurance and provider actors given
opportunities to have roles in the
future system(some provider groups
vocally opposed to reform)
General Practitioners ‘disgruntled’ but
little engagement with them or with
professional associations; Medical
Association resisting NHI
Bureaucratic
politics
Not raised as influence
(new provincial governments not
sufficiently well established to take
positions on financing reform)
Not raised as an influence
(primary health focus of provincial
governments was addressing HIV/
AIDS crisis)
Competition Commission’s HealthMarket
Inquiry (on private sector) may impact
on NHI
Other regulatory bodies tooweak to fulfill
mandates
Provincial departments resist
centralization of power proposed under
NHI
(Government employees fear loss of own,
current insurance benefits)
Budget
politics
National Treasury (Finance) officials
opposed all SHI proposals presented
on grounds of likely impact on tax
levels; controlled public sector
resource allocations within national
government and across provinces
Position of Treasury (Finance) not
specifically considered
(but broader economic concerns likely
to have maintained caution or
opposition to S/NHI)
National Treasury (Finance) officials
remain cautious, given e.g. broader
economic considerations, concerns
about national Health department
capacity, & design details
Wider political disputes between the
President and Minister of Finance
likely to have overshadowed NHI
decision-making
Leadership
politics
National Minister of Health strong
political leader of health reform, with
Presidential backing—but opposed
1997 SHI policy proposals
Political leadership focused on HIV/
AIDS policy for most of the period
Replacement of President Mbeki by
President Zuma, as leader of ANC
2007, then State President 2009, and
linked change of Minister of Health,
led to political support for NHI as
part of a populist platform
Broad Presidential support for NHI since
2009
Minister of Health is public champion of
NHI—but personalized leadership style
& little focus on implementation details
are weaknesses
National and provincial legislatures have
limited influence
Political tensions leading to replacement
of President Zuma by President
Ramaphosa as leader of ANC and State
President in 2017, create pressure and
uncertainty for NHI
(Continued on next page )
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politics appear to have played a significant role at any time.
Yet the rise of private sector costs in the 2000s and the
growing public system crisis in the 2010s might have pro-
vided opportunities to generate public support for broader
financing reform.11 In addition, there has been some recent
contestation from the provincial government level around
current NHI proposals, which seem to threaten their role
and powers in the health system.11 Finally, Table 1 highlights
how broader contextual factors not only underpinned the
contestation experienced over time—but also, at times, dis-
tracted from (e.g., HIV/AIDS policy debates, political ten-
sions within the ANC, student protests), or provided
opportunities for (e.g., leadership change within the ANC),
moving financing policy change forwards.
USING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY FRAMEWORK
TO SUPPORT FINANCING POLICY REFORM
Sparkes et al.6 make clear that the application of this frame-
work is intended to feed into the development of political
strategies to support policy change, rather than primarily
being a tool for retrospective analysis. Further reflection
about South African experience highlights four issues to
consider in terms of this practical application.
First, for the framework to be used as a strategy tool,
a team or group within the central public bureaucracy must
be mandated with developing political strategies to manage
financing reform, and must have relevant expertise and
experience. This role goes well beyond the technical and
analytic work that is more usually the focus of health finan-
cing or policy analysis units within public bureaucracies.
In the early stages of financing reform in South Africa,
for example, the national Directorate of Health Financing
and Economics (established to conduct relevant analytic
work) was simply too powerless to perform this broader
role, and lacked experience and expertise. Whilst relation-
ships with external health economists strengthened the
Directorate’s analytic capacity, these analysts did not bring
sufficient political awareness to their work at this time.8
Twenty years later, Waterhouse et al.11(p28) reported that
NHI is “poorly integrated in the Department, considered by
some as an ‘add-on’, there are challenges with coordination,
and differences in ideology and approach affect the cohesion
of efforts.” Although work towards NHI is now coordinated
within the national Department of Health by a much more
1994–19997 2000–20109 2007–201710
Beneficiary
politics
Beneficiaries not engaged, considered
around SHI
Despite public support for NHI,
confidence in the public health
system fell over time
Towards end of period, Civil Society
Organizations made public
statements of support for NHI
Growing middle class support for NHI,
given increase in private sector costs
Civil Society has had little impact on
NHI debates, although broadly
supportive
Little active public understanding and
engagement, though potential for
support
External
politics
Not raised as influence
(country not dependent on donor
funding and had global political
backing post-apartheid era)
Not raised as an influence Not raised as an influence
(Minister calls on global UHC
movement as support for NHI;
various external organizations
provided technical expertise)
Critical
contextual
factors of
influence
Inheritance of inequitable & inefficient
health system;
First democratic government in an
initially difficult economic climate;
Macro-economic policy favored growth
over redistribution;
Period of significant public
administration and health system
reform
The HIV/AIDS epidemic & HIV/AIDS
policy denialism;
Rising private sector health costs;
Political stability followed by
leadership challenge within the
ANC;
Macro-economic policy favored growth
over redistribution; 2008 economic
crisis
Growing public health system crisis;
Leadership challenges within the ANC
at start and end of period;
Growing awareness of large-scale
public sector corruption, based on
patronage politics;
Growing macro-economic challenges
(Fierce student protests led to
government commitment to free
higher education)
TABLE 1. Summarizing Nearly 25 Years of Health Financing Policy Debate in South Africa (using available documents; italics identify
points additional to the source documents)
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senior civil servant than in the early years of financing
reform, there are few other technical experts engaged in
this work, challenges are experienced in coordinating work
across multiple units and groups, and with the Treasury, and
the use of external consultants limits the extent to which
their work is integrated with other departmental activities.11
In 2018, moreover, a new team, led from the Presidency,
appeared to be taking charge of the reform process.
However, it remains unclear whether purposeful, political
management of the financing reform process is itself seen
as part of the mandate and role, or is a skill set, of those
working towards implementing NHI reforms.
The first step in applying a political economy lens to
support financing reform is, then, to establish a central
level strategy team that is mandated, and has the relevant
expertise, to support the reform process. Bringing together
officials from Health and Treasury/Finance may often be
important, as in South Africa. More broadly, the expertise
such a team needs includes the skills required to conduct
stakeholder analyses and develop political strategies—as
well as considerable experience of the political and bureau-
cratic context, formal communication expertise and personal,
and ethical awareness.12 Knowing your context is especially
important in making the sorts of judgements that are
required in stakeholder analysis and in developing relevant
political strategies. Earlier work on health reform change
teams offers additional insights on the role and expertise
needs of such teams,13 and such teams might be considered
within the bureaucratic politics dimension of the framework.
Second, the team charged with supporting financing
reform implementation simply must have strong relationships
with high-level political leaders whilst, at the same time, these
leaders must actively work with their strategy team.
Leadership politics is a central element of the framework.6
Political leadership and leaders able to manage the internal
politics of their party or government as well as interest groups
and external actors, are a necessary resource for implementa-
tion. In addition, these leaders must trust their financing
reform team. In early South African experience, distrust
between the then Minister of Health and the financing tech-
nical team undermined policy development in that era.8
Across periods, and quite different political contexts, the
personalized nature of Ministerial leadership for health finan-
cing reform was another constraint to policy reform—limiting
consideration of the wider evidence base and engagement
with wider expertise, or leading to policy concessions to
interest groups that seemingly contradicted the broad goals
of NHI.8,11 As politicians are ultimately not able to direct the
overall process of implementation, they must—if truly
committed to UHC goals—allow and support strategy teams
to do the work required to move reforms from ideas to
legislation and on to systemic change. Indeed, at a system
level, the separation of political and administrative spheres of
influence is widely recognized as a necessary facet of the
governance arrangements needed to support well performing
health systems.14,15
Third, the framework6 suggests it is important to think
carefully about beneficiary politics, but Table 1 suggests that
the voice of beneficiaries has been quiet or non-existent in
South African financing debates. Perhaps, as Waterhouse
et al.11(p52) note, this is because “public knowledge and
understanding of South Africa’s NHI is limited,” and NHI
reform is certainly complex and multi-faceted. Yet, these
authors also comment that public opinion data from 2012
suggest a base of popular support for NHI (which could be
grown), even though most sources of public information are
biased towards the private health sector and middle-class
interests; whilst other analysts have suggested that commu-
nications targeting the middle classes around the notion of
social solidarity could garner wider support.11
Overall, then, beneficiary silence in South Africa may
well reflect a failure to engage the broader public around
the values and goals of financing reform around the public
value it can deliver. Since 2007, the Minister of Health has
been a vocal NHI proponent,11 but there has been little
evidence of a wider and pro-active political communication
strategy focused around clear messages or narratives, and
aimed at generating wider understanding and support for
NHI goals. Such support might, in turn, sustain policy
change despite contestation among policy actors. Political
leaders always have a legitimate role in setting out the driv-
ing vision for financing reform, but a broader, pro-active
communication strategy is likely to need the support of
a strategy team with relevant skills. Stakeholder analysis
must be combined with communication expertise, for exam-
ple; media engagement is essential. Alliances with civil
society organizations may also support popular mobilization,
but such networking demands its own skills as well as risk
management. Whilst experience presented in the Sparkes
et al. paper6 might suggest that tweaking policy design
may also be a relevant strategy in relation to beneficiary
politics, this holds the risk of creating unexpected opposition
in response to new design features, or of undermining the
potential to achieve policy goals.8,12
Fourth, in seeking to support policy implementation—
beyond policy formulation—the central level strategy team
must take account of the multi-level nature of bureaucracies
and health systems, as well as the discretionary power of
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street level bureaucrats to resist or support change.16,17 As
Campos and Reich18 note, significant reform, like financing
reform, ultimately requires organizations and people to
behave differently and so commonly disrupts the status quo
and almost inevitably generates resistance. Such reform
requires the management of actors all along the implementa-
tion chain, as well as the relationships between them, even as
those relationships are themselves being tested by the
reform. These contestations go beyond the issues of bureau-
cratic politics currently considered in the Sparkes et al.
framework,6 and yet often cause policy implementation
blockages and are widely recognized as central to the efforts
to improve quality of care and develop system resilience that
must accompany UHC.19
In South Africa, for example, given the quasi-federal
nature of the political and administrative system, the 2018
NHI Bill challenges the current health system powers and
roles of provincial governments—and may require revisions
to the 2003 National Health Act and even the 1996
Constitution. Provincial governments’ resistance to these
proposals may be partly offset by political alliances between
the national Minister and provincial Ministers of Health from
the ruling party (the ANC), although wider contestation
within the ANC may underlie such resistance.
At the same time, the quite instructive approach to health
policy implementation, including financing reform, commonly
adopted by national level policy actors has itself generated
challenges for new policies across the health system.20 Only
limited efforts were previously made by the national Minister
and Department to engage provincial departments over NHI or
listen to their concerns and ideas about implementation.11
Further, the proposals suggest that the DHS will play
a critical role in the envisaged NHI system, including in mana-
ging private sector provider contracting. Yet in most provinces
the capacity of the DHS is currently so weak that it will need
considerable development to be able to play this role.11 There is
no clarity about how this capacity development will occur and
managing it from the national level makes little sense given the
size and diversity of the country, and the NDOH’s own capacity
limits. Provincial governments might, then, be an important
intermediary in developing the public health system envisaged
in the NHI proposals—but wider political action would first be
needed to address the egregious governance failures indicated
by corruption scandals (state capture) in some provinces.21
Finally, the middle managers located at district, sub-district
and facility level are all also critical players in implementing
financing and other health reforms. They mediate and trans-
late all policy and managerial imperatives received from
higher level authorities for lower level managers and front
line health providers, and through this role can either enable
collective action towards policy goals or exacerbate workplace
challenges and morale—with consequences for patient experi-
ence of health care and the broader public’s understanding of
the policies being implemented.22,23 Capacity development
for NHI requires then, developing distributed leadership
across the health system alongside the organizational cultures
that support the exercise of this leadership, and appropriate
delegation of powers.20,23,24
These experiences indicate that in relation to bureaucratic
politics it is important for the central strategy team to think
beyond the early stages of policy implementation, to con-
sider both how to manage implementation over time and how
to strengthen the wider health system so that it routinely
harnesses the collective action needed to sustain
implementation.25 This team cannot itself direct or manage
the full chain of actors involved in the continuing processes
of implementation. It can, however, engage with those who
routinely do this management, seeking their advice and ideas
about financing reform implementation. It can also establish
the processes of learning-through-implementation that allow
necessary policy re-development and innovation, and them-
selves help build system capacity.8 Such learning could be
supported by the action, monitoring and reflection cycles
common to quality improvement processes,19 for example,
alongside other capacity strengthening efforts (see below). In
South Africa, meanwhile, more direct engagement with pro-
vincial and district health managers about the opportunities
for, and likely challenges of, implementing NHI-linked
reforms is essential in the future; as well as purposeful
piloting around focused reform issues accompanied by delib-
erate learning and evaluation strategies.
Wider experience14,15 offers further, specific suggestions
about how to strengthen system capacity to support policy
implementation. Central strategy teams should plan system-
wide leadership development, alongside structural changes
to re-distribute power down the system. They should also
consider how formal planning, budgeting, procurement and
human resource management processes can be adapted to
enable the multiple actors of the system to work towards
agreed and shared goals. However, new forms of monitoring
and tracking to support learning and strengthened mechan-
isms of public and peer accountability must be established
from the bottom up, in response to experience and to chan-
ging system and context realities.19,25 Guiding top-down and
bottom-up strategies of system strengthening towards the
goal of capacity development represent stewardship.
Ultimately, this is a system characteristic that must be
embedded into the governance arrangements and processes
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of the health system and brought alive by leadership,26 rather
than a task of political management exercised exclusively by
a central leadership or reform team.
CONCLUSION
South African experience illustrates that health financing
reform must be recognized as a primarily political rather
than technical process. Strategic planning for reform must,
then, embrace political management—of the obvious gov-
ernment and interest groups, as well as the less obvious
front-line implementers and indeed, the public at large,
whom reform is intended to benefit but who are often
overlooked. This special issue breathes new life into the
importance of political economy analysis. Application of
this analytical lens demands a dedicated and mandated
multidisciplinary team located at national level, engaged
with political leaders, but also able to support communi-
cation with the public and develop the health system’s
everyday capacity to manage the politics of implementa-
tion and sustain reform over time.
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